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A Partial Defense of an Anti-Discrimination
Principle
Michael C. Dorf

Abstract
Over a quarter century ago, Professor Fiss proposed that the constitutional principle of equal
protection should be interpreted to prohibit laws or official practices that aggravate or perpetuate the subordination of specially disadvantaged groups. Fiss thought that the anti-subordination
principle could more readily justify results he believed normatively attractive than could the rival,
anti-discrimination principle. In particular, anti-subordination would enable the courts to invalidate facially neutral laws that have the effect of disadvantaging a subordinate group and also enable them to uphold facially race-based laws aimed at ameliorating the condition of a subordinate
group. Since Fiss’s landmark article appeared, Supreme Court doctrine has, at every turn, rejected
his anti-subordination principle in favor of a narrower, more formalistic anti-discrimination principle. In the Court’s view, the equal protection guarantee primarily targets discrimination against
individuals on a small number of forbidden grounds. However, the anti-discrimination principle
as such should not be taxed with the Court’s adoption of equal protection hyper-formalism in
the name of anti-discrimination. Both anti-discrimination and anti-subordination are sufficiently
open-ended conceptions of equality to produce a variety of morally attractive and not-so-attractive
outcomes.
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I.

1

Two Conceptions of Equality

What is the best interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?1 The Clause grew out of an American tradition honoring the general
principle of equality that goes at least as far back as Andrew Jackson,2 if not to the
Declaration of Independence,3 or even the Mayflower Compact.4 In an earlier age it
might have been possible to argue that the Clause requires only that the law, whatever its
content, be “equally binding upon every member of the community.”5 Yet, the time
when the meaning of “equal protection” could be separated from the meaning of
“equality” has long passed, if it ever existed. Today, any convincing account of the
Equal Protection Clause must also be, at least in substantial part, an account of the
general concept of equality.
At the conceptual level, however, equality is, if not entirely empty,6 so hotly
contested that it can be invoked with (equal?) aplomb by those on either side of our most
divisive national questions: Does affirmative action remedy or create inequality? Is a
right to abortion necessary for sex equality or anathema to the equal right to life of the
unborn? Is the proscription of some but not all categories of discrimination in civil rights
statutes the paradigmatic instance of legally required equality or the conferral of special
rights? Answers to such questions do not derive from the abstract concept of equality
but, at best, from more particularized conceptions of equality and other norms.
To what sources should a contemporary reader of the Constitution turn in
choosing an appropriate conception of equality? After constitutional text, courts and
1

Except where otherwise noted, in this essay I use the term “equal protection clause” to include
the principle of equal protection applicable to the federal government via the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
2
See Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Reevaluation of the Meaning and
Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 Law and History Review 293 (1985); Howard
Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner ERa Police Powers
Jurisprudence (1993).
3
It may seem difficult to take seriously the Declaration’s egalitarian language in light of its coexistence with slavery. See Scott v Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How) 393, 410 (1857) (“the enslaved
African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and
adopted this declaration”), although even before the Civil War there were those who did argue
that the Declaration could be taken as an applying to all persons. See id. at 574-75 (Curtis, J.,
dissenting); Cf. Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or
Anti-Slavery?, 2 Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass 467-80 (P. Foner, ed. 1950), reprinted
in Paul Brest & Sanford Levinson, Process of Constitutional Decisonmaking 207-11 (3d ed.
1992) (arguing that slavery was inconsistent with the ante-bellum Constitution).
4
Compact Made on Board the May Flower (Nov. 11, 1620), in Contexts of the Constitution 1
(Neil H. Cogen, ed. 1999) (undertaking to “enact constitute, and frame, such just and equal Laws,
Ordinances, Acts, Constitutions, and Officers, from time to time, as shall be thought most meet
and convenient for the general Good of the Colony”).
5
Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 470 (1871) (approving the Tennessee Supreme Court’s
derivation of this principle from the “law of the land” clause of the Tennessee Constitution)
(citing Wally’s Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 554 (1831)).
6
See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982).
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scholars typically list history as the next most authoritative source of guidance, but here
too, the conventional approach provides scant help. There is general agreement that the
central, original purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, indeed, of the entire Fourteenth
Amendment, was to protect African-Americans against the Black Codes (whether
directly or through Congressional legislation).7 Yet today virtually no one thinks the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause can be restricted to its original purpose, narrowly
defined. The Clause is majestically inclusive in its language, not confined to AfricanAmericans, inequalities based on race, or even unequal treatment among citizens.
Moreover, there is broad consensus that, whatever its merits in other contexts, a
jurisprudence of narrowly defined original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause
is morally unacceptable because it would license such odious institutions as racially
segregated schools, anti-miscegenation laws, and the grossest forms of discrimination
against women. This is not just a problem for liberals. Whatever they may think in their
heart of hearts, conservatives who are generally sympathetic to originalism cannot openly
say that Brown v. Board of Education8 was wrongly decided. Accordingly, they concoct
implausible accounts of the Reconstruction-Era understanding of segregation.9 And
those conservatives who wish to preserve not only the decisions invalidating segregation
but also those invalidating most forms of affirmative action must blind themselves even
further.
Strikingly, not a single Supreme Court opinion arguing for the
unconstitutionality of race-based measures aimed at helping rather than harming AfricanAmericans even attempts to reconcile that view with the Freedman’s Bureau and like
Reconstruction-Era institutions.10
Thus, neither liberals nor conservatives are willing to be guided by the nineteenthcentury understanding of equal protection in its narrowest form. And as soon as one
7

See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67-71 (1872); Akhil Amar, The Supreme
Court, 1999 Term Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 64 (2000)
(“the Fourteenth Amendment framers clearly aimed to prohibit [Black Codes] as a paradigm case
of impermissible legislation”); Eric Foner, Reconstruction 257 (1989); Michael W. McConnell,
The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's “Moral
Reading” of the Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1269, 1281 (1997) (“The clearest and most
indisputable purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to provide constitutional authority for the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, which outlawed the Black Codes.”).
8
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegration Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev.
947 (1995) (invoking Republican support in the 1870s for a bill outlawing segregated schools as
evidence of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment); see contra Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309, 2337-43 (1995)
(reviewing Owen M. Fiss, Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910 (1993))
(observing, inter alia, that in its day, the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), was largely uncontested); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and
Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881, 1884-1914
(1995) (arguing that Brown contradicts the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions—A Response to
Professor McConnell, 13 Const. Commentary 223, 228-31 (1996) (same).
10
See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale L.J. 427, 429-32 (1997); Eric
Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 Va.
L. Rev. 753, 754-83 (1985).
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moves to a somewhat higher level of generality – but not one that is so general as to
provide no real guidance, like “equal protection means treating people who are similarly
situated in the same way” – the disagreement over the appropriate conception of equality
re-emerges.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has tended to favor a particular conception of
equality in its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Defining the Clause as targeted
primarily at discrimination against individuals on a small number of forbidden grounds,
the Court views it as a mandate of formal equality. This conception stands in stark
contrast to the principle, elaborated by Professor Fiss over a quarter century ago, and at
the time a plausible description of the Court’s doctrine, that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits laws or official practices that “aggravate[] (or perpetuate[]?) the subordinate
position of a specially disadvantaged group.”11 Despite Fiss’s contention that the groupdisadvantage principle could do a better job of accounting for the egalitarian
jurisprudence of the Warren Court than the anti-discrimination principle could, in the
years since Fiss wrote Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has, at every
turn, chosen anti-discrimination over group-disadvantage.
Fiss argued that non-discriminatory government actions ought to be invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause when they directly disadvantage a subordinated racial
group.12 He explained that the group-disadvantage principle made sense of the
otherwise-problematic decision in Shelley v. Kraemer.13 There is no difficulty finding
unconstitutional state action in a case like Shelley, Fiss contended, if one does not treat
equal protection as co-extensive with the anti-discrimination principle. The argument
was accordingly critical of the Court’s decision in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,14 not to
mention Milliken v. Bradley.15
Closely linked to Fiss’s proposed reinterpretation of state action doctrine was his
contention that laws and policies that have a negatively disparate impact on a
traditionally disadvantaged racial minority are, ipso facto, unconstitutional, even absent a
showing of intentional discrimination.16 He found some support for this proposition in
then-current precedent, especially cases interpreting statutory norms,17 but his main line
of argument for this and other manifestations of his group-disadvantage principle was
straightforwardly normative: the central command of the Equal Protection Clause is that
the government shall not subordinate African-Americans or similar social groups,
regardless of motive. Current doctrine squarely rejects that view.18
Fiss also contended that race-based government programs that benefit
traditionally disadvantaged groups, and especially those that benefit African-Americans,
are generally valid because they do not relegate those persons who do not receive the

11

Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 157 (1976).
See id. at 136-41.
13
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
14
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
15
418 U.S. 717 (1974). Quite literally. Fiss did not mention Milliken
16
Fiss, supra note 11, at 157-59.
17
See id. at 142 n.55.
18
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (holding that facially neutral laws that
disparately impact minorities do not, absent more, trigger heightened scrutiny).
12
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relevant benefit to a subordinate status.19 In contrast, pursuant to a principle of
symmetry, the Court has held that all racial classifications must be subject to the same
exacting scrutiny.20
Finally, Fiss conceded that there may be institutional reasons why the courts are
poorly positioned to enforce the group-disadvantage principle. All manner of
government actions not motivated by race – from funding of schools, transportation, and
health care to siting of locally undesirable land uses – can and do disadvantage
subordinated racial groups; yet it would be unmanageable for courts to assume
responsibility for all such occurrences. Thus, Fiss allowed that the anti-discrimination
principle might be justified as a judicially enforceable shadow of the Equal Protection
Clause.21 However, acting pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress would remain free, and perhaps would be obliged, to enforce the groupdisadvantage principle.22 The Supreme Court has rejected this view as well, holding that
Congress has no authority to legislate on the basis of a broader substantive understanding
than the Court’s own.23
Was the Court right to prefer the anti-discrimination principle over Fiss’s groupdisadvantage principle as the exclusive conception of the Equal Protection Clause?
Neither the text nor history of the Fourteenth Amendment dictates one rather than the
other principle.24 Perhaps, then, it is a mistake to seek a coherent overarching conception
of equality. Courts might instead simply decide equal protection cases on an ad hoc
basis. After all, there may well be no theory of equal protection that is both acceptable to
all of the Justices of the Supreme Court and explains all or even most of the Court’s
jurisprudence. In this view, incompletely theorized agreement, as a modus vivendi, is all
that one can hope for.25
But such minimalism is, at best, an account of the outputs of a multi-member
institution like a legislature or court that must reach compromises among persons with
different convictions. It is hardly a prescription for how an individual judge, legislator,
or citizen should think about the meaning of equality – or anything else. Moreover, the
formal requirement that judges provide reasons for their decisions tends to produce
19

See Fiss, supra note 11, at 129-36.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995); City of Richmond v. J. A.
Cro
son , Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989). The Court’s most recent pronouncement on this
subject indicates that strict scrutiny may not always be fatal when applied to affirmative action
programs. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519
(1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)). The claim that strict scrutiny is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in
fact,” was first made in Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term–Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 8 (1972)).
21
See Fiss, supra note 11, at 175-76.
22
See id. For a fuller elaboration of this idea, see Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1239-42 (1978).
23
See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
24
See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1976) (“The text and history of the clause are
vague and ambiguous”).
25
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996).
20
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relatively abstract formulations of the equality principle, such as the Justices’ frequent
claim that Fourteenth Amendment rights belong to individual persons, not groups.26
Furthermore, with few exceptions, even minimalists are not nihilists.27
Minimalists, along with virtually everyone else, accept that purposeful discrimination
against members of a traditionally subordinate group on the basis of race denies equal
protection. And this then raises the question of which, if any, of the italicized terms are
essential to such a judgment. That question cannot be answered except by reference to a
substantive conception of equality.
To be sure, a somewhat different sort of minimalist might say that the judicially
enforceable interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause should not extend beyond the
core of consensus. On such a view, racially neutral laws that have a disparate impact
would be valid absent an illicit subjective purpose, but so too would most forms of
affirmative action – a complete victory for neither the anti-discrimination principle nor
the group-disadvantage principle. The competing conceptions would battle it out in the
political domain.
Whatever the attraction of such a conventionalist jurisprudence in other
contexts,28 it creates an enormous embarrassment where equality is concerned. The
contemporary consensus that purposeful discrimination against members of a
traditionally subordinate group on the basis of race denies equal protection is of relatively
recent vintage. Earl Warren’s appealing rhetoric in Brown notwithstanding, different
treatment on the basis of race is not inherently unequal in the sense that a society cannot
be conceived in which segregation connotes no subordinate status for one group or the
other.29 Only by rejecting separate-but-equal in favor of some other conception of
equality (but-exactly-what-we-are-not-quite- sure), could the Brown Court overrule Plessy
v. Ferguson.30 And thus the embarrassment: the now-widely-accepted principle that
purposeful discrimination against members of a traditionally subordinate group on the
basisof race denies equal protection was not at all a matter of consensus when Brown
was decided. Accordingly, the conventionalist minimalist must say that Brown was
wrongly decided, even if it has become right by virtue of subsequent acceptance. One
can think, as I do, that public acceptance plays a substantial role in determining the path
of constitutional and other judge-made law, but making retrospective acceptance the
pivot on which turns the correctness of the defining decision of a half century is at least
highly problematic.

26

See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.
A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
27
Indeed, while there are those who doubt the ability of courts to provide principled
interpretations of constitutional norms such as equality, see, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Taking the
Constitution Away From the Courts (1999); Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999),
even they argue forcefully for some conception of equality as a political principle.
28
See Henry H. Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the Process of
Adjudication 20-40 (1990), for a defense of conventionalist judicial review.
29
As Charles Black explained, what made separate unequal was the social meaning of
segregation in the real world. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421 (1960).
30
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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In any event, even conventionalism is itself a controversial conception of the
Equal Protection Clause (or perhaps of constitutional interpretation more generally), for
which reasons can appropriately be demanded. The argument that conventionalism better
respects democracy than either the anti-discrimination principle or the groupdisadvantage principle is just that, an argument. It takes no great imagination to envision
conceptions of democracy in which even (indeed especially) widely
- approved
discriminatory or group-disadvantaging decisions provide the occasion for judicial
interference with majoritarian decision making.
II.

Which Anti-Discrimination Principle?
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause did not, however, directly grapple with
these jurisprudential questions. At bottom, it was result-oriented. Although Fiss granted
that there were difficult questions for any conception of equality, it is hard to read Groups
and the Equal Protection Clause without drawing the inference that the main virtue of the
group-disadvantage principle was its ability to produce certain answers that the antidiscrimination principle could not plausibly produce.
One could criticize Fiss’s methodology as backwards. Should not constitutional
principles determine concrete results, rather than vice-versa? But perhaps this criticism is
not as potent as it first appears. Constitutional adjudication might be thought to strive for
a reflective equilibrium between, on the one hand, moral intuitions about concrete cases
and, on the other hand, a variety of factors that go into the selection of a conception of
some constitutional command. The argument would then focus on the institutional
mechanisms for measuring both the moral intuitions and the factors on the other side of
the balance.
In the balance of this Essay, I want to put this institutional question aside and ask
whether Fiss was right even on his own terms. Let us grant arguendo that, even standing
by itself, the pattern of results reasonably obtainable under any particular conception of a
relatively open-ended constitutional provision is a legitimate basis for selecting one
rather than another interpretation. Nonetheless, Fiss overstated the extent to which an
anti- discrimination principle naturally leads to the conception of equality as formal
equality that has characterized the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence over the last quartercentury. The constitutionality of neutral laws that have a disparate impact on a protected
class, of affirmative action, and of Congressional efforts to “enforce” a version of the
Fourteenth Amendment that differs from the one the courts enforce are all difficult
questions – but they are difficult whether or not one accepts group-disadvantage, antidiscrimination, or something else as the best conception of the Equal Protection Clause.
Let us take these questions in turn.
A. Disparate Impact
Should laws that have a disparate impact on a traditionally disadvantaged group
be understood to trigger any special judicial scrutiny? Fiss thought that they should, and
that this understanding was a logical interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause but not
one that flowed out of the anti-discrimination principle.31 Yet we can see that the very
debate that Fiss characterized as a struggle between group-disadvantage and anti31

See Fiss, supra note 11, at 136-46.
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discrimination re-emerges even if one accepts anti-discrimination as the appropriate
conception of equality.
Consider a statutory provision that is expressly written as an anti-discrimination
principle. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that no person shall, “on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any [federally funded] program or
activity.”32 In Alexander v. Sandoval,33 a 5-4 Supreme Court ruled that there is no private
right of action to enforce a Department of Justice regulation prohibiting recipients of
federal funds from using neutral criteria that “have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin.”34 The core prohibition of
Title VI is on express or purposeful discrimination, the Court reasoned, and prohibition
of disparate impact was too far removed from that core to permit the assumption that
Congress intended there to be a private right of action to enforce the regulation.35
Although the Sandoval majority asserted that it is “beyond dispute . . . that [Title
VI] prohibits only intentional discrimination,”36 the four dissenters thought that the
disparate impact “regulations are inspired by, at the service of, and inseparably
intertwined with [the statute’s] anti-discrimination mandate. Contrary to the majority’s
suggestion, they ‘apply’ [the statutory] prohibition on discrimination just as surely as the
intentional discrimination regulations.”37 My concern here is not with who has the better
of the argument,38 but with the fact that the argument persists in nearly all of its intensity
once one moves from the general concept of equal protection to the supposedly more
determinate conception of anti-discrimination.
B. Affirmative Action
The same broad point applies as well to the question of whether race-based
affirmative action is legal. Here too, the disagreement persists even after one moves from
equal protection to anti-discrimination.

32

42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001).
34
28 C.F.R. § 104(b)(2) (1999).
35
See Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 1511, 1518-23 (2001).
36
Id. at 1516.
37
Id. at 1531 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38
Proponents of treating disparate impact as by itself constitutionally objectionable seldom
address the question whether a policy’s disparate impact voids the policy in toto or only for
members of the disadvantaged group. Consider, for example, Test 21, the civil service
examination used by the Washington, D.C. police force and challenged in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1976). Test 21 had a disparate racial impact on African-Americans.
Under a disparate impact regime, could the test nonetheless be used in screening white
applicants? Doing so would create an explicit racial classification, in which white applicants take
Test 21 but African-Americans are screened by some other mechanism. If that is unacceptable,
does this mean that an unsuccessful white applicant should have standing to challenge the use of
Test 21 on the grounds that it has a disparate impact on African-Americans? For a discussion of
this kind of standing inquiry in equal protection cases, see Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to
State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 251-61 (1994); Michael C. Dorf, The
Heterogeneity of Rights, 6 Legal Theory 269, 278 (2000).
33

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Issues in Legal ScholarshipSymposium: Antisubordination Theory [2002], Article 2

8

Consider another federal statutory provision that is expressly worded as an antidiscrimination principle. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 instructs employers
not “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”39 A parallel provision applies the identical principle to job training programs.40
Nonetheless, in United Steelworkers v. Weber,41 the Supreme Court ruled, 5-2, that Title
VII does not prohibit an employer’s voluntary efforts to redress a racial imbalance in its
workforce by giving a hiring preference to African-American applicants for an on-the-job
training program.42 Although Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist thought
this result impossible to square with the express anti-discrimination language of the
Act,43 the majority had no difficulty finding, based on the statute’s legislative history and
the context in which it arose, that this law forbidding racial discrimination permitted at
least some forms of affirmative action.44
Scholars have long debated whether the Court correctly characterized Congress’s
purpose in enacting Title VII, and if so, whether that should have been dispositive in
Weber.45 As with our disparate impact example, so here, I am not now much interested
in the right answer as such. Rather, my point is that the debate over the validity of
affirmative action is not resolved by construing equal protection as an anti-discrimination
principle. Most of those who read anti-discrimination language as categorically barring
affirmative action also read the language of the Equal Protection Clause as having exactly
the same effect.46 And by the same token, as Weber shows, those Justices and scholars
who find the words “equal protection” malleable enough to permit some preferences for
mem
bers of traditionally disadvantaged groups typically reach the same conclusion when
interpreting statutory anti-discrimination provisions.
To be sure, the actual decision in Weber conceded that a “literal” reading of the
anti- discrimination norm would forbid race-based affirmative action, but rejected that

39

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer,
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or
employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.”)
41
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
42
The particular program at issue in Weber was jointly administered by an employer and a union.
See id. at 197.
43
See id. at 216 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
44
See id. at 202-08 (opinion of the Court).
45
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, A Matter Of Principle 316-31 (1985); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 14-47, 80, 135, 173, 303-06 (1994); Philip P. Frickey, From the
Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 Minn. L. Rev.
241, 245-57 (1992) (describing Weber as the catalyst for theories that defend it, like those of
Dworkin and Eskridge, as well as public choice theory, which attacks it).
46
For example, Justice Scalia, concurring in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995), laid emphasis on the fact that the Equal Protection Clause applies to “any person.” See
id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
40
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reading based on the statute’s purpose and spirit. 47 Yet the concession was not obviously
necessary. One could plausibly argue that where a program of affirmative action is
sufficiently justified, the denial of some opportunity to non-minority applicants is not, in
the end, on the basis of race (or whatever the forbidden characteristic is), but is instead,
on the basis of whatever reason justifies the affirmative action program. Alternatively,
one might think that as used in the statute and every-day language, the word
“discriminate” means “invidiously discriminate,” so that distinctions drawn to benefit
traditionally disadvantaged groups fall outside its ambit.48 Whether one finds such
arguments persuasive is likely to have much less to do with one’s views about language
than about the moral and practical implications of affirmative action.
Still, it could be objected, it is at least a little bit easier to uphold affirmative
action under the group-disadvantage principle than under the anti-discrimination
principle. But this objection is perfectly ambiguous with respect to the question: easier
for whom? Once we acknowledge the substantial flexibility inherent in concepts like
group-disadvantage and anti-discrimination, to say nothing of the flexibility of the more
general equal protection norm, it is hard to imagine that these concepts – rather than firstorder moral intuitions, pragmatic judgments, and the like – are going to do much work.
Moreover, even if we grant that group-disadvantage makes it somewhat easier to
reach some normatively desirable results than anti-discrimination, it does not follow that
group-disadvantage is the better interpretation, for by the same token, group-disadvantage
will make it somewhat harder to reach other normatively desirable results.
Consider the intuition that discrimination against whites on the basis of race or
discrimination against men on the basis of sex, if not quite as harmful as discrimination
against African-Americans and women, nonetheless poses a more substantial
constitutional problem than discrimination against people who rent rather than own their
homes49 or against people who drive red cars.50 This intuition is widely shared. For
example, even those Justices who have been sympathetic to race-conscious measures that
aim to assist members of traditionally subordinated groups have advocated intermediate
scrutiny of such measures, rather than mere rationality review.51 Yet, by contrast with
the anti-discrimination principle, the group-disadvantage principle has difficulty
vindicating the intuition that there is always something at least a little problematic about
the use of certain criteria like race or sex, even if they are not being used to disadvantage
a subordinated group.
Fiss complained that under the anti-discrimination principle, “the permissibility of
preferential treatment [for blacks and, by extenstion, other disadvantaged groups] is tied
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See 443 U.S. at 201 (citing Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
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to the permissibility of hostile treatment against blacks [and other such groups].”52 This
is a fair complaint against color-blindness in its most extreme form, but not against antidiscrimination, nor even against a doctrinal structure that subjects all uses of some
suspect classification to the same level of scrutiny. An anti-discrimination principle does
not say that whites and blacks, men and women, or heterosexuals and homosexuals are
identically situated. What it does say “is that the government’s use of race [or sex or
sexual orientation] is frequently inconsistent with notions of human dignity,”53 in a way
that the use of other classifications – like owning versus renting or the color of one’s
automobile– is not.
C. The Section Five Power
As Fiss himself acknowledged, a judicial understanding of equal protection in
even the most narrowly formalist anti-discrimination terms is perfectly consistent with a
broader Congressional understanding pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Groups and the Equal Protection Clause argued that even if one were to
accept the anti-discrimination principle over the group-disadvantage principle as a matter
of judicial doctrine, such a decision should not bind Congress, because the principal
virtue of the anti-discrimination principle is its ease of administration by judges, and that
factor has no bearing on Congress’s judgment.54 Congress gets its warrant for action from
the People, not from its willingness to conform its decisions to formal barriers, and thus
should be free to go beyond the Court’s extrapolation from constitutional text.55
Although a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court rejects this logic, the Court’s argument is
based in principles of federalism, rather than the entailments of the anti-discrimination
principle.
* * *
Accordingly, an anti-discrimination principle can, without undue distortion: lead
to close scrutiny of laws that have a disparate impact on a racial minority; validate
affirmative action; and co-exist with a broader Congressional understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment than the one endorsed by the Supreme Court.
III.

Anti-Discrimination and Means-Ends Scrutiny
If the anti-discrimination principle can rather handily produce the results Fiss
sought, why was he so eager to criticize it? The answer, I think, is that despite nominally
targeting “the anti-discrimination principle,” the real focus of criticism in Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause was a peculiar version of the anti-discrimination principle,
namely, means/ends scrutiny of the sort described in the Venn diagrams of the classic
article by Tussman and ten Broek.56
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Means-ends rationality, Fiss argued, was the core of the anti-discrimination
principle;57 yet means-ends rationality could not, absent elaborate mental gymnastics,
identify those policies that offended the equality norm. To make the point, Fiss borrowed
an example from Paul Brest: “How should a court treat a [public] school principal’s
decision, based solely on aesthetics, to have black and white students sit on opposite sides
of the stage at the graduation ceremony?”58 Fiss thought it obvious that such a decision
would violate the Equal Protection Clause but that the anti-discrimination principle could
not easily reach this conclusion because the school principal’s chosen means are
extremely well suited to the end.59
The criticism is indeed telling, but only against a feeble version of the antidiscrimination principle. It is always possible to concoct some end that any challenged
policy fits perfectly, especially if aesthetics counts as a permissible end. There is, after
all, no accounting for taste. If aesthetics justifies racial segregation on a graduation stage,
it would also justify racial segregation on a school-by-school basis: the pattern of black
and white children walking to their respective separate schools may be more pleasing to
observers – purely as a matter of aesthetics, mind you – than the chaotic pattern that
results from integrated schools. Yet such a result is manifestly absurd.
In the foregoing examples, we might readily say that “aesthetics” is an
impermissible justification for treating people differently on the basis of race. That
judgment seems easy enough given that an aesthetic taste for seeing children separated on
the basis of race is likely to be related to other, more pernicious, attitudes about race.
More broadly, these examples show that any plausible account of means/ends scrutiny
must include some specification of what ends are permissible. To have any teeth at all,
means/ends scrutiny cannot be about fit alone.
Current equal protection doctrine recognizes this point by asking whether racial
classifications are narrowly tailored to serve compelling interests. What is this if not an
inquiry into whether the ends served by a racial or other presumptively invalid
classification are sufficiently weighty to justify the classification?
To see the role that ends scrutiny plays in current doctrine, it is worth asking what
goal heightened scrutiny serves. On one account, the compelling interest test is solely a
means for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate purposes. If a challenged policy is
not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest, courts assume that it serves an
invalid purpose, such as racial or gender subordination, and strike it down. There is
considerable support in the case law for understanding the compelling interest test in this
way.60
However, the compelling interest test is over-inclusive as a mechanism for
discovering illicit purpose. Suppose that a fire department hires only men. One
explanation for such a policy, perhaps the most likely, is illicit sex-stereotyping. Yet, the
57
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compelling interest test will condemn the policy even if uncontroverted evidence shows
that no sexist thoughts entered the minds of the fire department’s policymakers. Imagine
that these policymakers testify that their sole motivation was financial; they acknowledge
that there are some women who could satisfy a strength requirement that they sincerely
believe to be essential for doing the job, but they claim further that there are not enough
such women to justify the screening costs. Even if the court believes each of these
claims, the compelling interest test would condemn the blanket exclusion of women
applicants. The fact that a generalization based on a presumptively invalid criterion
happens to be true as a statistical matter does not justify the criterion’s use in particular
cases.61
The over-inclusiveness of the compelling interest test could be explained in
prophylactic terms. The real targets of the Equal Protection Clause, on this view, are
actions that reflect illicit motive, but because of the difficulty of proving motive, the law
presumes that a racial or other proscribed classification that cannot satisfy strict scrutiny
was adopted or employed because of an illicit motive.62
Alternatively, one can understand the compelling interest test as a limit on
ordinary cost-benefit analysis. In this view, the law permits some use of presumptively
invalid classifications, but, because of the dangers of such classifications, it does so only
when the benefits very clearly outweigh the costs.63 This account makes sense of the
intuition that in the fire department example we would not permit sex to be used as a
proxy for strength even if we ignored the problems of proving motive.
I do not attempt to resolve the question whether the compelling interest test is best
understood as simply about discerning illegitimate purposes or also includes a costbenefit component. I do note, however, that either understanding requires that courts
distinguish among different sorts of ends. They cannot simply inquire whether the means
fit whatever ends the government chooses to pursue.
That there is some weighing of ends under the cost-benefit view of the compelling
interest test seems obvious enough, but even under the prophylactic view, ends analysis is
necessary. Ends analysis is needed to sort sham from real purposes, because of the
possibility of articulating some purpose to which any policy is narrowly tailored. To
return to Brest’s example, aesthetics cannot ordinarily count as a compelling interest
because of the substantial risk that aesthetic judgments reflect or disguise illicit
judgments of other sorts.
Thus, even as debate continues about the justification for the compelling interest
test, there is no doubt that it includes some weighing of ends. Fiss’s critique – in
targeting a version of the anti-discrimination principle that focuses solely on fit – does
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not apply to modern anti-discrimination law. More broadly, whether or not Groups and
the Equal Protection Clause fairly characterized the anti-discrimination principle in
1976, the intervening years have shown that a framework of anti-discrimination can
indeed accommodate the anti-subordination concerns that moved Fiss.
Consider, in this regard, one of the most contentious questions in equal protection
doctrine: what sorts of interests are sufficiently weighty to justify race-based affirmative
action, and under what circumstances? Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court in Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke,64 stated that “the
interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university’s admissions program.”65
Whether that view reflects current law is an open question.66
Fiss was right, of course, that means/ends analysis cannot tell us whether an
interest such as diversity is compelling,67 but wrong, I think, to conclude that the antidiscrimination principle is deficient as a consequence. Constitutional doctrine is rarely
self-applying. Nonetheless, a doctrine that asks for especially strong justifications for
some kinds of action provides real if not complete guidance to decision makers. Or, to
put the point in a way that emphasizes that an anti-discrimination principle can leave
room for Fiss’s group-disadvantage principle, the fact that a challenged race-conscious
government measure benefits members of a traditionally and still oppressed group should
be relevant to the question whether the measure serves a compelling interest. The group
perspective enters into the analysis on the compelling interest side of the ledger. In my
view, this does not require us to “stretch and strain” the anti-discrimination principle,68
but only to flesh it out.
IV.

Conclusion
Viewed from one perspective, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause is a
period piece, a relic of a more egalitarian but bygone era. Constitutional doctrine has
rejected each of the central features of Fiss’s group-disadvantage principle: facially
neutral laws burdening subordinated groups receive no heightened judicial scrutiny; raceconscious government action that benefits such groups is presumptively invalid; and
Congress has no substantive power to expand the judicial protections for equality.
Yet, even as the Supreme Court has embraced formal equality at nearly every
turn, the last quarter century has witnessed an expansion in the coverage of antidiscrimination norms. Statutory prohibitions on age, disability, and sexual orientation
discrimination have been enacted. And although the path remains rocky, even the Court
64
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has broadened the scope of its proscription on sex stereotyping,69 while admitting gays
and lesbians into the circle of protected persons.70 Especially in United States v.
Virginia71 and Romer v. Evans,72 the Court’s willingness to see the reality of exclusion
for bona fide social groups reflects an understanding of the Equal Protection Clause that
is both an interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle and, at bottom, consistent
with the understanding Professor Fiss urged in 1976. Although Fiss did not think so, the
anti- discrimination principle is broad enough to do much of the important egalitarian
work that he so articulately championed in Groups and the Equal Protection Clause.
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